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PRODUCTS LIABILITY SYMPOSIUM
without any such knowledge. To impose liability where the utility
is less than the risk of harm and to excuse the manufacturer when
the risk is less than the utility of the product is an artificial distinc-
tion. Also, under this approach, the injured person is denied recov-
ery where the product is more useful to the public, but he is allowed
recovery, and, therefore, the loss supposedly spread to all consum-
ers, where it is found that the risk of harm is greater than the utility
of the product to those same consumers.
Although the injured user or consumer of a product should be
protected, the mere fact that the manufacturer has the deeper
pocket should not be the controlling factor. The injured party need
not prove negligence on the part of the defendant, but he should
be required to prove that either the defendant could have found and
corrected the defect had he utilized all scientific knowledge avail-
able to him or he could have given a warning so that the consumer
could have taken precautionary measures. The manufacturer of a
product which has a scientifically unknowable risk inherent in it
should be excused from liability under strict liability in tort.
RICHARD E. BYRNE
INDUSTRY-WIDE JOINT LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The issue presented in this article is whether or not an entire
industry may be held jointly and severally liable under a theory of
strict liability for injuries caused by its products. In its broadest
form, this concept of industry-wide joint liability could impose
liability upon an entire industry if the plaintiff could show that: 1)
there was an injury caused to him by a product of that industry;
2) the product was defective, unreasonably dangerous and it
reached the plaintiff without substantial change in its condition;1
3) the manufacturers adhered to an industry-wide custom in pro-
ducing the product.2 Whether or not the actual manufacturer could
be identified would be irrelevant since all of the manufacturers
would be liable for the action of one of them.
Industry-wide joint liability should be differentiated from two
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT § 402A].
2. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text infra.
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traditional theories of joint liability that may, at first, appear to
impose a form of industry-wide joint liability on an industry. For
example, one traditional theory of joint liability would impose
liability where each of the defendants caused the plaintiff injury,
but the harm was not capable of apportionment among the defen-
dants. In this situation, the burden of proof as to the apportion-
ment of harm caused by each defendant is shifted to the defen-
dants.3 The plaintiff, therefore, need not prove the specific harm
caused by each defendant. The policy reason for this shift in the
burden of proof is that tortfeasors should not escape liability
merely because the harm done is of such a nature that the plaintiff
is unable to prove how much damage was caused by each tortfea-
sor.' The difference between this theory and the theory of industry-
wide joint liability is that in the latter, although the damage is
capable of apportionment among one or more manufacturers, the
entire industry remains jointly and severally liable to compensate
the injured plaintiff.
Under another traditional theory of joint liability, a group of
manufacturers comprising an entire industry may be held liable if
those manufacturers acted in accordance with a common plan of
action which resulted in injuries to the plaintiff. This would consti-
tute a joint tort in the historic common law meaning of the phrase.5
The difference between this theory and the theory of industry-wide
joint liability is that in the latter it may not be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove an expressed or implied agreement among the
defendants to act in concert eliminating a key element of proof
required under this traditional theory.'
As a general proposition, industry-wide joint liability involves
three unique characteristics. First, under certain circumstances a
manufacturer of a product may have liability imposed upon him
for injuries caused by a similar "product in a defective condition"7
produced by another manufacturer in that same industry. Second,
the elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case may
be fewer and easier to prove than in an ordinary negligence case.8
Third, since the industry as a whole is not within the "chain of
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965).
4. Id. comment c.
5. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 at 291-92 (4th ed. 1971).
6. See notes 18-20, 27-28 and accompanying text infra.
7. RESTATEMENT § 402A.
8. See notes 22-29 and accompanying text infra.
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distribution" 9 which includes the manufacturer, distributor and
seller of the particular object that caused the actual injury, the
imposition of industry-wide joint liability means that the liability
is spread horizontally and not vertically as is true in the usual
products liability case."
This article is divided into three sections. The first section dis-
cusses the cases of Hall v. Du Pone de Nemours & Co." (herein-
after referred to as Hall) and Chance v. Du Pone de Nemours &
Co. ,2 (hereinafter referred to as Chance). These were the first cases
to raise the possibility of industry-wide joint liability. The second
section explores the possible theories and policies which could sup-
port the concept of industry-wide joint liability. The third section
deals with whether industry-wide joint liability is feasible in prod-
ucts liability cases and whether it is desirable.
I. THE THEORIES OF Hall AND Chance
The sister cases of Hall and Chance raise the issue of whether
an entire industry may be held liable for injuries caused by its
products in unrelated accidents. It will appear that the theory of
industry-wide joint liability formulated by the court in Chance is
applicable only under a limited set of circumstances and it does not
impose an extensive form of liability. In Chance, the plaintiffs were
thirteen minors injured in unrelated accidents by blasting caps.
None of the plaintiffs were able to identify which manufacturer
produced the blasting caps which injured them. They sued six man-
ufacturers of blasting caps who represented virtually the entire
blasting cap industry and their trade association on various theo-
ries including negligence and strict liability. The plaintiffs con-
tended that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide
adequate warnings about the dangers of their products and failing
to produce a blasting cap that would not explode so easily. The
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. In
the course of its decision, the court formulated a theory of
industry-wide joint liability. In doing so, the court combined ele-
ments of two existing theories of joint liability with a new concept
of what constitutes joint control and integrated the result with the
theory of strict liability.
9. Little v. Maxam, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 875, 877 (S.D. I11. 1970).
10. Id.; see Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
11. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
12. Id.
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In Hall, the case also concerned minor children injured in sepa-
rate accidents by blasting caps. A number of manufacturers of
blasting caps and their trade association were sued. Through legal
maneuvers the number of defendants was reduced to two manfac-
turers. The plaintiffs were able to identify these two manufacturers
as the makers of the blasting caps that caused the injuries. In
addition, to the separate cause of action against each of the two
manufacturers, the plaintiffs maintained a cause of action against
the entire industry with the two manufacturers as representatives
of the entire industry. The court dismissed the cause of action
against the entire industry. The reasons for the court's dismissal
of the cause of action against the entire industry and the effect of
that dismissal upon the theory put forth in Chance will be discussed
later in this section.
The court in Chance drew upon two older theories of joint
liability. One of those theories was formulated in the case of
Summers v. Tice"3 (hereinafter referred to as Summers). In
Summers the plaintiff and defendants were members of a hunting
party. The two defendants negligently shot in the direction of the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff received pellet wounds. Only one of the
defendants could have caused the injury, but the plaintiff was un-
able to identify who was the tortfeasor. The court allowed joinder
of both tortfeasors and shifted the burden of proof as to which one
caused the injury to the defendants. If they failed to prove which
one was causally negligent, both would be jointly and severally
liable for the damages. 14 The elements of this theory that are im-
portant in relation to Chance's theory are:
1. The plaintiff is required to prove that the defendants are
negligent,"5 i.e., breached a duty owed to the plaintiff;
2. The burden of proving which tortfeasor caused the injury is
shifted to the defendants;"
3. The defendants' joint and several liability is contingent upon
their failing to carry the burden of proof as to which of them
actually caused the injury. 7
The second theory of joint liability which the court in Chance
drew upon is represented by Bierczynski v. Rogers8 (hereinafter
13. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
14. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
15. Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 968.
18. - Del. _ 239 A.2d 218 (1968).
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referred to as Bierczynski). In this case the two defendants were
drag racing when one of them struck the plaintiff's car. The court
rejected one defendant's contention that he could not be found
liable for the plaintiff's injuries since, although he was drag racing,
his car stayed in the proper lane and it never struck the plaintiff's
car. This defendant was still found to be a joint tortfeasor. Joint
liability may be based on concert of action as evidenced by an
express or an implied agreement. The court found that the act of
drag racing was sufficient evidence of an implied agreement." This
theory of liability requires the plaintiff to prove:
I. All elements of causal negligence, i.e. duty, breach, cause
and damage. 21
2. Conduct by the defendants sufficient to show an express or
implied agreement to act in concert.
As previously stated, Chance combines elements of the above two
theories of joint liability along with a new concept of joint control
to create a limited form of industry-wide joint liability.
The fact situation in the Chance case is similar to that in the
Summers case since the plaintiffs cannot identify which defendant
actually caused the damage, and therefore, the burden of proving
causation is shifted to the defendants.2 Chance is also like
Bierczynski since the court found that the defendants could be
jointly and severally liable because of their joint action. 2 However,
a number of factors make the theory of joint liability in Chance
different from the theories in Summers or Bierczynski. In
Summers, as a prerequisite to shifting the burden of proof of caus-
ation to the defendants, the plaintiff had to prove that the defen-
dants were negligent, i.e., a duty and its breach. 23 A cause of
action sounding in strict liability, as it is used in Chance, does not
require proof that the defendants were negligent.24 Thus the burden
of proving causation is shifted to the defendants without a need for
the plaintiff to prove negligence. In addition, if the defendants in
Summers could prove which one of them actually caused the in-
jury, then only the tortfeasor who was causally negligent was liable
for the damages. The Chance theory seems to have extended liabil-
19. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 143.
21. 345 F. Supp. at 380.
22. Id. at 373-74.
23. 33 Cal. 2d at _, 199 P.2d at 3.
24. RESTATEMENT § 402A.
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ity to all the defendants even if they could establish which company
produced the blasting caps causing the injuries to the plaintiffs. 25
There are two elements of the Chance case which tend to support
this conclusion. First, if it was merely a question of identifying
which manufacturer produced the blasting caps which caused the
injuries then there would be no reason to join the trade association
in the action. Second, if the court was merely applying the theory
of Summers there would have been no need to engage in a further
discussion of different types of joint liability and the policies under-
lying them.26
Chance also appears to be akin to the fact situation in
Bierczynski because the defendants in Chance may be jointly and
severally liable because of their joint action. In Bierczynski, how-
ever, the plaintiff was required to show an express or implied
agreement to act in concert. In Chance it is suggested that, in some
instances, adherence to an industry-wide custom might be suffi-
cient to impose joint liability on all of the defendants, including the
trade association, without showing evidence of an express or im-
plied agreement to act in concert.2 7 The court states that adherence
to an industry-wide custom in the manufacture of a product may
be, in some instances, an alternative to showing either an express
or implied agreement.2
In summary, it can be seen that the theory set forth in Chance
does not require the plaintiff to prove negligence, causation, or
express or implied agreements between the defendants. It is possi-
ble that industry-wide joint liability may be imposed if the plaintiff
can prove that he has been injured by a product, that the circum-
stances of such injury would be sufficient to impose liability upon
the manufacturer of such product, that the plaintiff is unable to
identify which manufacturer actually produced the product causing
him injury, and that there exists adherence to an industry-wide
custom as to the manufacture of such product. The theory of
industry-wide joint liability proposed in Chance appears to lessen
the burden of proof of the plaintiff while extending the liability of
the defendants. However, it appears that the theory of Chance will
be limited in its application to those cases with the same facts as
are found in Chance, i.e., a product capable of causing serious
25. 345 F. Supp. at 371.
26. Id. at 370-78.
27. Id. at 374.
28. Id.
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bodily injury, an industry with a limited number of manufacturers,
and the inability of the plaintiff to identify the individual tortfea-
sor. The court's rejection of joint liability of the industry in Hall
was based upon the plaintiff's ability to identify the individual
manufacturers that produced the product that actually harmed
him.2 9 If the court in Chance was proposing a broad form of
industry-wide joint liability, then it should have made no difference
in Hall whether or not the plaintiff could identify the actual tort-
feasors. Therefore, the court in Chance seemed to be formulating
a remedy to be used only in circumstances where the plaintiff is
unable to identify the specific tortfeasor.
II. INDUSTRY-WIDE JOINT LIABILITY-THE THEORIES AND
UNDERLYING POLICIES
The theories that have been advanced as reasons for the devel-
opment of the theory of strict liability are the natural starting point
for inquiry into the theoretical basis of industry-widejoint liability.
Industry-wide joint liability may be considered to be an extension
of one of the basic purposes of strict liability-the reallocation of
risks on other than a fault basis.3 1 Strict liability is not considered
to be a radical departure from past practices of the court in impos-
ing liability. In the past, when manufacturers sold directly to con-
sumers the manufacturer could be held liable for a defective prod-
uct under certain circumstances. Strict liability, to some extent,
reestablishes this direct consumer-manufacturer relationship by
cutting through the complex maze of modern distribution systems.
The movement from the fault concept in negligence to negligence
per se has had a slow but steady development in the case law.31 Is
the movement from strict liability to industry-wide joint liability
part of this natural development?
There are two major categories of theories which have been
proposed as bases for strict liability. One may be termed the in-
surer theory and the other may be termed the deterrence theory.
Are either of these theories broad enough not only to justify strict
liability but industry-wide joint liability? The importance of deter-
mining which theory underlies industry-wide joint liability is that
29. Id. at 383.
30. See 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 216 (1973); Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technol-
ogy Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587 (1969).
31. Noel, The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 1014-15 (1957). But
see Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products, 24
TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957).
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the theory, in general, has an effect upon the proof required to
impose liability on a defendant. For example, if the industry is
considered an insurer, the emphasis will be less upon the element
of fault than upon whether or not the plaintiff can prove that his
injury is one that the defendants should insure. If, on the other
hand, the deterrence theory is used, then the emphasis will be upon
whether or not the manufacturer is able to reduce the dangerous-
ness of his product.
The theories under the insurer theory all have a central theme
-the manufacturer should pay to varying extents for the injuries
caused by his products. This is so even though no actual negligence
can be demonstrated on the part of the manufacturer. One theory
states that society may burden one of two innocent parties where
it would result in a maximization of benefit to society. 2 The
Workmen's Compensation rules would be an example of this.
While there may not be an argument with the theory itself, there
certainly is a question of whether or not the courts are the proper
instrument of government to create this type of liability. The Ore-
gon Supreme Court directly faced this issue in Cochran v.
Brooke.33 In that case the plaintiff lost his sight from the use of
the drug manufactured by the defendant. The court found for the
defendant, stating that the plaintiff had an extremely rare reaction
to the drug. The plaintiff contended that the drug manufacturer
should be required to include in the cost of manufacturing drugs
the amount needed to set up a general compensation fund for any
injuries caused by his drugs. The court rejected this contention,
ruling that while it would be a just result, it is not for the courts
but for the legislature to require such a fund.
Another theory under the insurer theory is called enterprise
liability. This theory focuses on the fact that an enterprise involves
certain distinctive risks. These risks may result in injuries.34 When
this theory is used as a basis for strict liability the proof centers
on the court's interpretation of what risks the enterprise should be
held liable for. The liability is on a continuum ranging from the
injuries caused by the kind of risks the enterprise is likely to cre-
32. German, Products Liability-Strict Liability?, 33 INS. COUNSEL. J. 259, 265 (Apr.,
1966).
33. 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966).
34. James, General Products-Should Manufacturers be Liable Without Negligence?,
24 TENN. L. REv. 923 (1957).
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ate 5 to liability for injuries caused only by unreasonable risks
involving the product.3 Green v. American Tobacco Co.37 illus-
trates liability for the kind of risks the enterprise is likely to create.
In this case the plaintiff sued for damages from a cigarette manu-
facturer claiming that he developed cancer as a result of smoking
the defendant's cigarettes. The evidence showed that it was not
scientifically possible for the defendant to have known of the can-
cer producing qualities of his product when the plaintiff had started
to smoke cigarettes since he had started to smoke at the turn of
the century. Nevertheless, the court held the defendant liable upon
the theory of implied warranty. The court ruled that the merchant-
ability of a product depends not upon the manufacturer's knowl-
edge of the defect, but upon the question of whether the product is
or is not safe. In this case, the court considered the manufacturer
to be like an insurer in that it made no difference that the plaintiff
could not prove fault on the part of the manufacturer. The manu-
facturer's responsibility was not dependent upon his skill or
knowledge.
On the other end of the continuum lies the case of Lartigue v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 31 in which the court found for the
defendant upon facts similar to those in Green v. American To-
bacco Co. While the risk created by the enterprise was the same
in both cases, in Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. the court
found the risk not to be unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff.
The court ruled that the defendant was liable only for unreasonably
dangerous risks and in order for the risk to be so considered it
would have to be foreseeable by the defendant.
Can industry-wide joint liability be justified on the basis of the
enterprise theory? All manufacturers engaged in producing the
same type of product create the same types of risks. However, is
risk creating sufficient cause to impose liability on an entire indus-
try where the products of a single manufacturer in that industry
can be identified as having caused the injury in question? Risk
creating is the justification for the enterprise theory, but one of the
major purposes of the enterprise theory is to provide the injured
party with compensation for injuries caused by a manufacturer's
35. Id. at 925. But cf. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 800,
n.65 (1966).
36. Comment, An Extension of Joint Liability in Products Liability Law, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 191, 199 (1973); RESTATEMENT § 402A.
37. - Fla. _____ 154 So. 2d 169 (1963).
38. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
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product.39 In the aforementioned tobacco cases, while the courts
came to opposite conclusions as to the defendants' liability, the
courts still did not suggest that the entire industry be subject to
liability since the plaintiff could identify the particular manufac-
turer whose product caused him harm. Where the defendant was
liable and solvent the plaintiff was compensated and this would
seem to be sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the enterprise theory
without going beyond the scope of the single manufacturer. Thus,
at best, the enterprise theory would justify the imposition of
industry-wide joint liability in the limited situation where the man-
ufacturer who produced an injury-causing product was insolvent.
The theory represented by the Restatement (Second) of Torts °
is a type of enterprise liability with a slightly different emphasis.
The stated reasons for imposing strict liability are:
1. The seller has assumed a special responsibility to persons in-
jured by the product by virtue of selling the product;
2. The public expects that the seller will stand behind the prod-
ucts it is forced to buy from him;
3. The burden of the cost of injuries should be on those who
manufacture the product as part of the cost of production,
against which insurance may be purchased;
4. Someone should protect the public and the manufacturer is in
the logical position to do so.4
These reasons focus upon the situation created by a complex
manufacturing-distribution system which involves the difficulty in
tracing the defect in the product back to the manufacturer, 42 the
relative helplessness of the consumer4 3 and the superior loss dis-
tribution mechanism available to the manufacturer through the
ability to raise prices and procure insurance.4 Although there is a
different emphasis, this enterprise theory bears the same relation-
ship to industry-wide joint liability as does the enterprise theory
originally discussed.
The second major category of theories proposed as a basis for
strict liability is the deterrence theory. Philosophically the deterr-
ence theory is in opposition to the insurer theory. While the goal
39. James, supra note 34.
40. RESTATEMENT § 402A.
41. Id. comment c.
42. Noel, Strict Products Liability Compared With No-Fault Automobile Accident
Reparations, 38 TENN. L. REv. 297, 304-05 (1971).
43. Id. at 311-12.
44. Id. at 312-13.
[Vol. 57
PRODUCTS LIABILITY SYMPOSIUM
of the insurer theory is to provide compensation to the injured
party, the purpose of the deterrence theory is to force the manufac-
turer to make safer products. Thus the ability of the defendants to
reduce the risk is a condition precedent to imposing liability. In
Chance the court felt that the adherence of the manufacturer to an
industry-wide custom might be sufficient to indicate that the defen-
dants jointly controlled the risk and ipso facto would have been in
a position to reduce that risk.45
The deterrence theory may be subdivided into two parts-the
general deterrence theory and the specific deterrence theory. The
general deterrence theory states that what is produced depends on
market choices made by individual consumers whose choices will
in turn depend on the price of the product. The closer the price of
the product is to its true cost, the more people tend to get what
they want. However, when the costs are understated there tends to
be overproduction and customers buy more of the product than
they want or need and thus certain unnecessary costs are under-
taken by society. Accidents caused by products are as much a cost
factor of the product to society as the actual cost of manufacture.
Society wants the safest products at costs that are not prohibitive.
It wants the manufacturer to use means of production which may
be more expensive in material costs but which reduce the cost in
accidents. The manufacturer is in the best position to balance the
material versus the accident costs. 46
The specific deterrence theory does not focus upon the eco-
nomic aspects of deterrence, but rather upon the strategic position
of the manufacturer in the manufacturing and distribution process.
The manufacturer is in the best position to correct any defects in
these processes.47 Although it may be impossible to prove that the
manufacturer was negligent in a case where a product has caused
injury, there is usually some suspicion that some carelessness was
present, either in manufacturing, design, testing or warning." This
concept applies particularly to those cases in which the manufac-
turer uses the defense that he adhered to an industry-wide custom.
An entire industry may lag in the adoption of new and available
technology that might eliminate some of the risk in its product
45. 345 F. Supp. at 372.
46. Calabresi, Fault, Accidents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75
YALE L.J. 216, 223 (1965). Although this article is on no fault insurance, this theory seems
to be equally applicable to industry-wide joint liability and its "no fault" concepts.
47. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,_------, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
48. Noel, supra note 42, at 311.
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because it adheres to an industry-wide custom.49 The imposition of
liability acts as an incentive to control the danger.51
Is the deterrence theory a sufficient basis for the imposition of
industry-wide joint liability? It would appear that this theory can
be useful as a basis for imposing industry-wide joint liability only
where there is no differentiation between the methods used by
members of the industry. Since the deterrence theory is founded
on the assumption that the imposition of liability will deter manu-
facturers from making defective products, it would be the anti-
thesis of the purpose of the deterrence theory to impose liability
on an entire industry where some members were manufacturing
safer products than others. The deterrence theory requires differen-
tiation between those who manufacture defective products and
those who do not.
Even if it were to be postulated that an entire industry was
manufacturing a defective product, could industry-wide joint liabil-
ity be imposed on the basis of the deterrence theory? There would
still be a difficulty since the deterrence theory requires as a basis
for the imposition of liability that the defendant be able to reduce
the risk. While it is logical that a single manufacturer can control
the risk of his own production, it does not necessarily follow that
an entire industry can do so. First, there would be a question as to
whether an industry as an entity could have this kind of control
without violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.51 Second, what
proof would be required in order to show this kind of control?
While traditionally an express or implied agreement among the
manufacturers would be required, Chance states that adherence to
an industry-wide custom may be sufficient. 52 It can be argued that
anything less than an agreement among the manufacturers cannot
show the kind of control which the deterrence theory requires. If
this agreement can be shown, then traditional liability could be
imposed without using a new theory of industry-wide joint liability.
Finally, the very basis of the deterrence theory may be questioned.
The deterrence theory assumes that the imposition of liability will
act as an incentive to make manufacturers more careful. This may
be a false assumption. When the deterrence theory was proposed.
as a basis for strict liability, Prosser noted that if the manufacturer
49. Comment, An Extension of Joint Liability in Products Liability Law, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 191, 200 (1973).
50. Prosser, Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
52. 345 F. Supp. at 374.
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was unmoved by negligence liability, res ipsa loquitur, and damage
to his reputation, then the additional imposition of strict liability
would not deter him.5 3 Assuming this, then will the addition of
industry-wide joint liability deter a recalcitrant manufacturer?
III. INDUSTRY-WIDE JOINT LIABILITY-Is IT FEASIBLE AND IF
So Is IT DESIRABLE?
There are a number of factors which tend to make industry-
wide joint liability procedurally unfeasible in a great number of
situations. One problem is that in order to commence suit in fed-
eral court under 28 U.S.C. section 1332, there must be a proper
diversity of citizenship among the plaintiffs and the defendants. 4
The greater the number of defendants, the more likely it is that one
or more manufacturers will be domiciled in the state where the
plaintiff is domiciled. Since a state cannot be on both sides of a
controversy, the plaintiff would not have proper diversity and thus
would not be able to continue suit in federal court. If, in addition,
there is more than one plaintiff the likelihood of improper diversity
is increased. If the plaintiff would be required to exclude a manu-
facturer in order to maintain diversity would industry-wide joint
liability still apply since not all of the members of the industry
would be defendants?
Another problem the plaintiff faces in federal court is what
choice of law principles are to be applied in a case where the
defendants, plaintiffs and sites of injury are to be found in different
states. It should be noted that the court in Chance recognized that
this was a difficult and complex question but avoided a determina-
tion of it by assuming a national body of state tort law.5 5 The
problem, therefore, remains unsolved in that case.
Finally, the defendants in an industry-wide joint liability case
will be subjected to considerable inconvenience and expense in
defending a suit. Manufacturers from different parts of the country
will have to defend the suits in states other than their state of
domicile. The plaintiff may expect motions to sever, as occurred
in Chance and Hall.5 A new remedy such as industry-wide joint
liability will not be entertained by the court when it imposes such
53. Prosser, supra note 50, at 1119 & n.142.
54. Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 575 (1806).
55. 345 F. Supp. at 360. The question of whether the jury or the court should decide
the conflict of laws problem was decided in Chance v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 57
F.R.D. 165 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
56. 345 F. Supp. at 359, 384. See28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); F.R.C.P. 20, 21.
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heavy burdens upon the defendants unless very compelling reasons
to do so are shown to the court.5 7 The court apparently would have
the authority to refuse industry-wide joint liability under its general
procedural power to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action.' 58
The question of the desirability of the theory of industry-wide
joint liability is dependent in a large measure on what ramifications
can be predicted should this new theory of liability be allowed. For
example, if in the future, only one manufacturer is sued, should he
be able to implead the rest of the industry for contribution or
indemnification? This may result in almost every manufacturer
becoming involved in a continuous series of litigations. Besides the
expense and time involved, would the manufacturers be able to
procure insurance to protect themselves when there is almost a
certainty of litigation? Another question concerns exactly what will
be required of an entire industry before the industry as an entity
can escape this type of liability. Will each industry be required to
set up joint .funds for common research and defense? Once again
this raises the possibility of antitrust violations.59
On the positive side, the existence of industry-wide joint liabil-
ity may help to prevent the small manufacturer from going bank-
rupt as a result of paying a large products liability judgment. The
large manufacturers would be able to sustain these losses without
severe damage and the injured party would be assured of a solvent
defendant. However desirable this may be, as has been previously
mentioned, it is questionable whether the courts rather than the
legislature should be the instrument to bring about this change.
Legislatures have, in fact, acted to set up precisely this type of
general compensation fund in areas where the public has shown
great conceri over the compensating of a damaged plaintiff. An
example of this would be Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 646 (1971)
where the state requires all insurance companies to contribute to
a central fund which is used to pay the claims of persons who hold
policies in bankrupt insurance firms. There is a similarity between
the insurance situation and industry-wide joint liability. In both
cases an industry may be required to pay the plaintiffs even though
they are not themselves at fault. The state has made a policy
decision incorporating the losses to the public as part of the cost
of doing business.
57. 345 F. Supp. at 383.
58. F.R.C.P. 1.
59. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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CONCLUSION
At present there does not exist a broad type of joint industry-
wide liability in tort law. The cases of Hall and Chance represent
at best a limited form of this type of liability which may only be
used in cases where the plaintiff is unable to identify which of a
number of negligent defendants caused him injury. There does not
appear to be any justification for extending liability from one man-
ufacturer to an entire industry under the theories which underlie
the imposition of strict liability upon the single manufacturer. Nei-
ther the insurer theory nor the deterrence theory provides a justifi-
cation for the expansion of a manufacturer's liability to an entire
industry. The theory of industry-wide joint liability has a number
of inherent practical problems such as diversity of citizenship and
conflicts of laws. While it may be desirable to have industry-wide
joint liability in certain situations it would appear that the legisla-
ture, and not the courts, is the proper branch of government to
bring about this type of liability.
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